The 1995 Hyogoken-Nambu earthquake of January 17, 1995 resulted in a devastating damages to the highly developed urbanized region of Kansai, and created a total of 20,000 Gg (20,000,000 ton) of debris. Debris clearance in two years became an urgent and difficult emergency management issue for the disaster managers in Kobe city and Hyogo prefecture. The status of debris clearance was reviewed for each of the demolition operation phase, transportation, crushing and separation at a temporary storage location, disposal at final landfill site phases in terms of problems and state of progress. In practice, most of the debris may be either disposed of at landfill sites or reused as materials for construction. Therefore the debris clearance operation should focus on the geotechnical engineering approach as an important post-disaster issue to control the quality of the incoming flow of potential soil materials. The importance of an emergency management perspective in this geotechnical approach which takes into account the different criteria related to the operation execution is proposed.
INTRODUCTION
The 1995 Hyogoken-Nambu earthquake of January 17, 1995, a magnitude of 7.2 (Richter scale), was the first major earthquake which hit a highly developed urban region in Japan since the 1923 Kanto earthquake. This earthquake resulted in devastating damage of more than 6,300 deaths and a total of about 17 trillion yen (200 billion US dollars) direct physical loss from damage in the Kansai area, mainly in Kobe city of Hyogo prefecture. About 200,000 public and private buildings and individual houses collapsed, and many road and railway bridges have also collapsed. Accordingly, about 20,000 Gg of debris was generated suddenly due to this earthquake, as shown in Table 1 , which is equivalent to about 1/4 of the volume of total construction waste generated in Japan in fiscal year 1993, or equivalent to about 150% of the construction wastes generated within the Kansai region in that year. Debris clearance became one of the most urgent and difficult emergency management issues for disaster managers in both Kobe city and Hyogo prefecture as the indispensable basis for the recovery process. The national government promised that 95% of the expenses required for clearing debris generated from private buildings would be subsidized, and the government also set a time limit by March of 1996 when all the debris would be cleared from the impacted area, and the entire debris clearance operation would be completed by March, 1997 . Actually, most of the debris may be either disposed of at landfill sites or reused as construction materials such as coastal reclamation. Debris clearance operation should therefore be focused from the geotechnical engineering approach as an important post-disaster issue related to the control of the quality of the incoming flow of possible soil material, as well as the geotechnical aspects of normal waste management (Kamon, 1994) .
Debris clearance operations were begun immediately after the earthquake as shown in Table 2 . In the immediate response phase for the first several days after the earthquake, debris was cleared for search and rescue of disaster victims by both local residents and emergency officers such as fire-fighters, policemen, and the selfi) Associate Professor , Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University, Gokasho, Uji, Kyoto 611. ii) Research Associate , ditto.
Manuscript was received for review on August 17, 1995. Written discussions on this paper should be submitted before August 1, 1996 , to the Japanese Geotechnical Society, Sugayama Bldg. 4F, Kanda Awaji-cho 2-23, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101, Japan. Upon request the closing date may be extended one month. waste generated by natural disasters such as earthquake may be called "disaster waste," which includes (1) night soil, (2) residential solid waste, and (3) debris. With regard to debris clearance, the national government promised a subsidy for privately owned buildings and facilities to speed up the clearance. It would be subsidized to the extent of 97.5% of all expenses required for clearing debris generated by individual houses and those private buildings owned by small businesses. The debris clearance of those private buildings owned by big businesses with the exemption for the expenses required for demolition would also be subsidized. In summary the distinction between industrial and municipal waste became blurred as to the disaster debris disposal and it became the responsibility of local government to process all kinds of disaster waste. The waste management capability of the local government therefore became an issue.
Basic Types of Waste Disposal Sites
It has always been a severe problem to secure ample waste disposal space in Japan. The reason for this is partly because of the scarcity of available inland areas for final disposal. As a consequence, coastal reclamation with waste materials has been a common practice in many urban areas in order to obtain adequate disposal space. At the final disposal site, there are three different types of systems based on the degree of control of leachate from the reclaimed waste: (1) least controlled landfill sites for safe and stable waste, (2) controlled landfill sites for safe but unstable waste, and (3) strictly controlled landfill sites for hazardous waste. As shown in Table 3 , the debris generated from an earthquake is basically construction waste in general. Construction waste amounts to about 20% of all industrial waste, and includes (1) concrete and brick, (2) plastic, (3) glass and ceramic, (4) metal, (5) rubber, (6) sludge, (7) wood, and (8) oil waste. The first five categories can be disposed of at "least controlled" landfill sites because they are safe and stable materials for reclamation.
As a common practice, each municipality has been responsible for securing disposal sites for those wastes generated within their jurisdiction. In the Kansai area, securing waste disposal sites within their jurisdiction has been so difficult for many municipalities that a large landfill site, named "Phoenix Center," has been established in the coastal area of Hanshin as the common final disposal site for the Kansai region.
Basic Rules for the Waste Management Since there is always an upper limit for waste disposal space, there are three basic rules for the waste management. The first rule is the minimization of waste generation. There has been practiced in many ways; (1) size reduction by milling and shredding, (2) incineration, (3) dehydration, and (4) desiccation. The second rule is the practice of making the wastes sanitary. Incineration has been the most popular practice in this respect in Japan. The third rule is the promotion of recycling. The debris may be either disposed of at a coastal reclamation landfill site as soil material or reused as material for construction. In order to practice these three rules, it is important to coordinate all the tasks required for waste management in the following stages: (1) demolition, (2) transportation, (3) intermediate treatment, and (4) final disposal at landfill site.
GENERATION, MANAGEMENT AND RELATED PROBLEMS OF DISASTER WASTE
Three types of wastes were generated due to the 1995 Hyogoken-Nambu earthquake, including night soil, residential solid waste, and debris. The generation as well as the management of the disaster waste depends on the phase after the earthquake. The Hyogo prefectural government estimated the volume of the debris generated due to the earthquake to be about 20,000 Gg as their third estimate after careful examination and discussion. Table 3 and Fig. 1 by the earthquake. A maximum of 320,000 refugees were located in 1,150 shelters. A total of 3,900 temporary toilet systems were installed at the shelters within 10 days after the earthquake (Kasuya and Iwasa, 1995) . The stockpiling of residential solid waste on streets was another distinctive disaster waste management problem. Many food and drink containers and bulky waste were generated soon after the earthquake. The garbage collection system was interrupted for the first four or five days after the quake. As a result, this waste was stockpiled on the streets. When these wastes were removed to temporary storage locations, garbage was stockpiled in a Fig. 3 . Outline of waste management and its impact different from the rest of the wastes. The pile of garbage has however remained there for many days even after the regular garbage collection and combustion service was restored, as shown in Photo. 1 (JGS, 1996) . Another big concern was the environmental impact due to rough treatment of damaged or abandoned electric appliances containing hazardous chemicals, such as refrigerators containing fluorocarbons. As a result of a great effort by the local government in cooperation with volunteer groups, about 5,000 abandoned refrigerators were collected by April and the fluorocarbon was extracted from them safely for the environmental protection (Kobayashi, 1995) .
Demolition of Collapsed Structures
The major issue of disaster waste was the management of collapsed houses and buildings and other public facilities. The total volume of the demolition waste was estimated to exceed 20,000 Gg. The collapse of wooden houses was remarkable, particularly in the belt area of JMS 7 in Kobe city (Wards of Chuo, Nada and Higashinada), Ashiya city and Nishinomiya city. 120,000 individual houses have been requested to be dismantled in this area, as shown in Table 4 . The debris from such wooden houses includes not only the waste timber and concrete blocks, but also soils, clothes, furniture, electric appliances and so on. In many cases they were mixed up with each other. For collapsed buildings and public facilities, the debris generated was mainly concrete and scrap steel. On-site separation of the debris may therefore be easier than for individual ordinary houses. The highway (Irie and Mori, 1995) . Some of the concrete lumps were temporarily stockpiled in the area of the waste disposal site (Phoenix Center) to be reused as a road base material.
Progress and Problems of Demolishing Collapsed Structures Demolition of public facilities and individual houses was carried out on a contract work basis by general contractors or other construction companies. Table 4 indicates impressive figures as to the progress and speed of the demolition operations; 27% of the total operations were been completed in the first two months and 58% was accomplished in the first four months. There has keen a trade-off between the speed and the quality of erations.
In many cases, demolition workers did their job just mechanically so that little on-site separation of waste was done. This resulted in a low quality of waste which could not be disposed of at "least controlled" disposal sites, and it also made size reduction at intermediate processing locations more difficult and costly. Environmental concerns for dust distribution from demolition operations attracted much attention. It was recommended that the target buildings be covered and watered down to prevent dust distribution. Because some dismantled buildings contained asbestos, the Environmental Agency of Japan carried out a field investigation on asbestos distribution in the air. The results as indicated by Table 5 were that the environmental impact due to demolition of the collapsed buildings may be negligible on an average, however, the asbestos distribution tended to be higher at locations closed to the demolition operations than the average. 
Transportation of Debris
Debris was transported either to temporary storage locations or final disposal sites. Because of the poor serviceability of the road network due to severe damage to two Hanshin expressways cutting through the impacted area, many debris transporting trucks became an addiPhoto. 2. Demolition of collapsed road bridges (Photos by J. Okada, Nakabori Soil Corner Co.) tional cause of traffic congestion. As indicated in Fig. 4 , the trucks loaded the debris gathered from collapsed individual house to the Fusehata disposal site located in an inland area of Kobe city, which caused severe traffic congestion on the access road for the first several weeks after the earthquake. In addition because there was no coordination between the capacity of the access road and the up- Table 7 shows the recycling and disposal capacity of disaster waste as reported by the Hyogo prefectural government. The foal was that concrete and metal scrap would be reserved for reuse and the remaining 40% of waste would be disposed of in the Phoenix Center after proper treatment such as incineration. Approximately 10,000 Gg of concrete will be reused in the new coastal reclamation plan in Kobe Harbor, as shown in Fig. 5 , which was a post-hoc plan to obtain ample reclamation space for recycling.
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES FOR DEBRIS CLEARANCE
It is important to treat the debris clearance issue as one of the most important emergency management issues. Since the debris clearance issue adopted a construction waste processing scheme as the model for its operation, civil engineers in this field tended to regard debris clearance as a matter of securing ample space for temporary stockpiling and disposal. The solution for them might be the "Phoenix Center" in the Kansai region. From the geotechnical perspective, however it would be of great concern to have an incredible amount of material less qualified for reclamation. The future of the debris reclaimed land might be jeopardized unless proper precaution has been taken to consider the geotechnical engineering aspects to control the quality of incoming reclaimed material. For this purpose, information about the entire debris clearance management program and the coordination based on such information are indispensable.
GIS Information for Debris Clearance Management
In Nagata ward of Kobe city a geographic information system (GIS) has been adopted to help the application process for disaster victims by showing the houses targeted for demolition and relevant information on monitor screen (Kameda et al., 1995) . This system also allows for the city officers by maintaining an unified database for debris clearance to keep track of their operations based on the application form, the identification of efficient demolition operation procedure, the monitoring against illegal cartel formation by demolition contractors, and the execution of contract forms. As a result, Nagata ward finished all of their contracts with demolition contractors by the end of April 1995, whereas other wards using a regular system were still in the middle of contracting. This is an example of how information processing is important in debris clearance.
Multiple Criteria for Evaluating the Debris Clearance Operations
Another example of the importance of the emergency management perspective is the social constraint set by the national government as to the date of the completion of debris clearance. In return to the subsidiary, national government requested that the local municipalities finish site would be lost. Engineers facing the debris clearance must take into account all the criteria proposed, before they decide with little time allowance. As shown in Fig.  6 , therefore t is definitely an emergency management issue which requires coordination among the relevant sectors.
CONCLUSIONS
The 1995 Hyogoken-Nambu earthquake which occurred on January 17, 1995 resulted in devastating damage to the highly developed, urbanized Kansai region, and created a total of 20,000 Gg of debris. Debris clearance within two years became an urgent and difficult emergency management issue for the disaster managers in Kobe city and Hyogo prefecture. 1) Providing ample space for temporary storage and disposal is not sufficient to make the debris clearance efficient.
The lack of coordination for the debris management phases of demolition, transportation, temporary storage and intermediate treatment, and final disposal resulted in many environmental and psychological problems in the impacted area.
3) The control of quality of incoming reclaimed material to the disposal site must be maintained in order not to jeopardize the waste management scheme in Japan even under emergency situations. 4) In order to evaluate the debris clearance management, there are many criteria related to the coordination of the entire management process in a single coherent system. 5) Information about the debris clearance operation is the key element for such coordination.
